Friday, November 22, 2013


Extracts from Feather, H. (2012) 'Cracking Capitalism...'
 
 
Cracking Capitalism…
 
 
The network of interdependencies amongst human beings is what binds them together… a structure of mutually oriented and dependent people…it expresses what we call ‘society’ …as neither an abstraction of attributes of individuals…nor a ‘system’ or ‘totality’ beyond individuals, but rather a network…(Elias, 2000, p.   )
 
 
 
       Where are the cracks[1]?
 
 
The recent focus on networking as a means  to personal success may be no more than the sensing of an epiphenomenon, an echoing of an everyday reality, the spectral presence of capital in what we take to be spontaneous contacts on the Internet etc.  However, the trite business-speak de nos jours (cf. J. Hobsbawm on networking[2]) may also be an indicator of something profoundly central to capitalist modernity: something lateral that escapes hierarchy,  subsumption, subjection to formations of capital.[3] The modus operandi of student protest, the Occupy movement, for example  suggests a form of networking that evades commodification –how is this possible, what are its grounds?  We will examine the spontaneous connections which underlie  more formalised, institutionalised social arrangements. These are not to be confused with ‘networking’ but are peer-oriented, often unnoticed ways of working upon which more conscious organisational processes are based- be they ‘horizontal’ or hierarchical formal arrangements.
        The concern of this discussion is with the way the  coordination and reciprocation constitutive of networks gets subsumed within modern capitalist social formations as its everyday life and the potential for circumventing this subsumption of the visible cracks, tensions which, for example, protest movements represent. The paper is a survey of some ideas that might facilitate seeing through or around modern capitalism.
 
 
          The way  into this discussion is made via a slight detour  into the exchange engendered  over the existence of hierarchy and networks by Giddens’ structuration theory.


[1].   This discussion was provoked or stimulated by  reading Holloway’s Crack Capitalism. The piece is not a response to Holloway and interprets cracks not as alternative spaces but as something more dynamic, conflictual representing not just escape routes, but rather a systemic intertwining of different forces which open up lines of visibility.
[2]   The Guardian, 2012, ‘It’s not what you know, but who- the return of an unfortunate reality’ June 30th, p.43
[3].  See David Harvey 2012, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution, for a critique of ‘horizontalism’, the pitfalls of which, hopefully, this paper avoids.   
 


         Mouzelis (1995, pp.123-4)  points out that Giddens in his theory of duality of structures does not  deal with hierarchy -although referring to power as a resource in relation to legitimacy. The implication here then is that this is a ‘flat’ theory rather than a theory of stratification, a theory of interconnection.

           
             Clearly (with Mouzelis) hierarchy is real but at the same time it is abstract; it posits relationships which exist outside the way people relate spontaneously beyond the bureaucratic definitions and  requirements of  formal settings; in that sense it is a reorganisation of concrete, informal relationships, ways of doing. As such it is a mode of abstraction from interactions as networks of associations and as such, arguably secondary to these, that is, the networks are its ontological ground because they already contain the content which appears in hierarchisation .
             ‘Labour’ as Marx (1974, p.78) argues , has a ‘two-fold social character’: the shape the value of commodities takes ultimately depends on ‘living labour’, the concrete relationships between producers, producers and products and producers and capitalists. Use value is  open-ended and depends on specific contexts and so commodities are shaped by creative forces outside the generality of the value form and  carry this with them to be extracted in different ways by different concrete users

         Arguably, every  hierarchy is also a network in which stratification is grounded: the members of hierarchies relate to each other as interactants, as elements of a network, as rhizomes, as well as rank statuses etc.
 
           The following is an illustration of how this conflict between subsuming organisational power and the popular, everyday, informal network  becomes visible.  Linux Open Source computer programming (Kelion, 2012) offers a way of linking various trade products such as Microsoft’s Windows packages to free software which in important ways parallel and provide access to those packages, i.e. provide alternative access to computing and the Internet.  Microsoft (ibid.) described Open Source programmes as ‘a cancer’ and ‘un-American’.  It reveals both the possibility that using the Internet can be improvised and controlled by users and renders visible the subsumption of networking by powerful organisations; one can see how Microsoft is ultimately dependent on coordination because Open Source does what they do without formal hierarchy. The  politics of the Internet is revealed, shown to function through the occlusivity of subsumption i.e. networking is made mysterious rather than everyday; it is blackboxed.
 
               
Teams and co-ordination: another way of thinking about  informal agency within hierarchised structures       
             Organisations frequently use ‘team’ or network strategies as these are believed seen to increase  potential for innovation, synergies, information flow, cross fertilisation and so on, via in effect creating new discursive formations. It’s an attempt to objectify, render visible, processes that go on anyway as the organisation’s taken for granted or black-boxed modus operandi. Hence formal ‘teamwork’ etc. is the misrecognition of the way the organisation actually functions i.e. the coordination, networks, interrelations which have been already subsumed as the ground of its bureaucratised structures. Company human relations techniques therefore attempt to harness  the drift of such informal logics for the benefit of company telos.  However, this is a case of the uncanny, as organisational strategy takes management ideas as its apparent ground by reproducing in objectified form something that already goes on informally.
 
                We can see then that subjects relate to an other in the mediated way that the other is given to the subject, that is as the subject’s otherness.  In coordination of activities with other subjects it is therefore its own  sense of relation  that the subject  has to negotiate, rather than its direct relation to an other as directly given to a subject’s consciousness. Elsewhere Mead (1970, pp.152-64) expresses a cognate idea:  relating via the ’generalised other’, and so on. This is a ‘different’, non-identical subject which exists in relation to, mediates self-identity. In other words, the other is given via its relationality, as for example, Sartre’s regulatory third shows. Harvey’s concept  of relational space is also productive here in that it enables us to view the subject as a coordinated existent constituted across different spaces.
 

One recalls here Beauvoir’s (Beauvoir, 1972, p.17)  argument that although in patriarchy men dominate women, they still require recognition in eyes of women, experience dependency on them  and thus there is the basis for mutual relation. The argument here is moreover posed in more general terms

 …if following Hegel, we finding in consciousness itself a fundamental hostility towards every other consciousness; the subject can be posed  only in being opposed- he sets himself up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential, the object.
       But the other consciousness, the other ego, sets up a reciprocal claim…willy nilly, individuals and groups are forced to recognise the reciprocity of their relations 

And in Beauvoir (1944)
                  I must recognise my situation as founded by the other, even while affirming my being beyond the situation…Only the freedom (subjectivity) of the other is able to give necessity to my being (pp. 83-4, 95-6). 

We can see from this that Beauvoir posits a mode of interrelating or intertwining of subjects which is a kind of conflictual intersubjectivity, one which exists between peers as such and also one which cuts across hierarchy to create a peer dimension there.

         Such reciprocity, coordination or network is a de-objectifying moment, one in which hierarchies, black boxes, categories are opened up and contents presented as interrelation, a kind of Deleuzian, rhizomatic moment.
 
 
 
 




Tuesday, November 19, 2013

Michael Dummett's Interpretation of Frege's  Context Principle / Theory of Meaning


is discussed at length in Feather, H. (2000/2010) Intersubjectivity and Contemporary Social Theory whereDummett's approach is seen as offering a basis for phenomenological social theory.

Hannah Arendt and Critical Theory

 

Critical Theory- critique of society in terms of the standards it upholds i.e. whether it does actually meet them…freedom, justice, truth, aesthetic standards etc.

Arendt as an influence on Habermas’s theory of communicative  action- the lifeworld as the basis of society, social systems

Arendt and phenomenological social theory. Influenced in turn by Schutz’s  idea of the life world as an open horizon where we avoid the classification, stereotypes, pigeonholing, objectification etc. found in institutional life. Lifeworld as taking everything in as we go along through the day etc., absorbing the formal world as a series of unstructured experiences which can then be  modelled/personalised to suit the individual’s outlook, situation. Improvisation.

Importance for Arendt: unpacks the power associated with  institutional life  e.g. bureaucracy, the world of strategic action. Weber’s iron cage melts away- institutional power depends on the people ultimately.

The public realm.  A concept from which Habermas derived his public sphere as the world of political action. Salons, debating societies, political groupings, parties, pressure groups. Engagement with the media as means of debate, spreading of ideas…

Political Action is foundational. It’s only through action in the public realm that we can create new departures- laws, constitutions etc. Arendt derives this insight from the Roman republic with its mass meetings in the Forum where the citizens decided state policy. Plebleian v. Imperial factions.  No neutral bureaucracy, direct democracy.

 

Differences with Habermas

Habermas argues that instrumental rationality allows a value- neutral consideration of ‘the facts’ about policies by disinterested state officials (following Weber). Arendt claims there is no value neutral instrumental rationality. Goals always influence our  calculations…we will go for a goal even if it less ‘efficient’ in terms of profit etc. See below.

Also,   rejects Habermas’s view that political action can take place effectively through the established institutions of the state in modern societies- Parliaments, state administration and parties

Gives examples from history of politically foundational action outside mainstream institutional life. Change from ‘below’: the people invent their own institutions-  French Revolution, Paris Commune, Russian Revolution, Hungarian workers’ councils (1956). Other examples might be the spontaneous self -organisation of workers and students in Paris in May ’68  (‘Autogestion’).

Habermas is opposed to the idea of direct democracy as bureaucracy contains neutral rationality- a systems functional rationality which is required for the coordination of society- follows Parsons here.

He also sees the rationality of the lifeworld and public realm as diminished by blocking mechanisms used by money and power to prevent arguments being heard e.g. press monopolies, advertising, concentrated political power, big business (food and drinks industries etc. re sensible eating/drinking) etc. He calls this censorship of ideas/understanding  ‘structural violence’.

 
Power

For Arendt power exists wherever people come together to act in concert  (cited in Habermas, 1986, p.78).

As with Foucault Arendt argues that the political system cannot dispose/use power at will. Power is a good for which the political groups struggle (slightly circular!) and with which a political leadership manages things.

Both find this good already at hand, already existing. They do not produce  it.

‘The impotence of the powerful’- they have to borrow their power from the producers of power

The producers of power- the people acting within the public realm. 

Idea of  the sovereign people.

 

Totalitarianism

Arendt- it is constituted out of elements existing in any contemporary setting- if they come together in a certain way (e.g. state securitisation, war on terror, surveillance techniques etc.)

4 Elements of totalitarianism

1.    Imperialist and capitalist expansionism  (also mimicked by Hitler and Stalin in Europe)

2.     Decay of the nation-state  (crisis in nation -state ). Brought about by imperialism- nation dominates over state- ethnicity dominates state in terms of rights , citizenship (see Hollande and the Hijab)

3.    Racism-  imperialist justification for conquest and biological basis for community makes citizenship redundant

4.    Alliance between capitalists/bourgeoisie and the mob. The  mob as the socially rootless, unscrupulous adventurers, chancers engaged in on-going criminality

NB. In a crisis bourgeois society abandons/downgrades economic goals and plays the race card- restricting immigration, scapegoating immigrants and minorities- as at present, arguably? Here the mob might include tabloid journalists as operating on the margins of criminality, perhaps?

 

 

 

Arendt: the Public Sphere and Totalitarianism

 The decline of the public sphere or realm  is associated by Arendt with the growth of totalitarian tendencies. Power of the state and business over the people/public (‘the totally administered society’- Frankfurt School  -important parallels with Critical Theory)

Canovan  (1992, p.121) –the distinctiveness of her position is that instead of seeing modern society as impersonal, rational, individualistic…she sees it as stiflingly uniform, paternalistic and monolithic. …it is like the familiar liberal nightmare of bureaucratic socialism (E. Europe under ‘communism’)  except that for her that nightmare includes liberal societies themselves

 
The political & cultural  trends behind totalitarianism:

1.    The Enlightenment- bureaucracy, homogenisation, abstraction, rationalisation, reification, erosion of individuality, spontaneity, difference

2.    Romantic Conservatism (neo-feudal view)- rejection of the following: reason in favour of myth e.g. ‘the nation’ and its ‘destiny’, rejection of science, democracy and  the republican ideal (the sovereign people)

 

Influences on Arendt:

1.    Enlightenment: political equality- the sovereign people, reason

2.    Marxism: The Frankfurt School critique of modernity as a crushing bureaucracy,  homogenising capitalism (passive, standardised consumers), decline of the public sphere –see also influence on Habermas

3.    Romanticism- she maintains some elements of this- plurality, diversity, uniqueness, individuality, spontaneity  (Goethe, Novalis etc.)

 

The origins of totalitarianism are the basic trends which come to make it up,  not historical causes or roots (Bernstein, 2008). Some features of this are:

 

(a) Homogenisation and the decline of individuality, difference,  plurality into robotic ’man’, ‘radical evil’ (see the death camps- Bettelheim and the ‘walking dead’ as extreme cases of this);

 (b) the power of nations over states which means territorial identities over universal ones,

 (c) the growth of superfluous population –peoples without rights, citizenship.

 

   

 

References

 

Arendt, H. (1986),’Communicative Power’, in S. Lukes (ed.) Power, Blackwell, Oxford

Canovan, M. (1992) Hannah Arendt: an interpretation of her political thought,  C.U.P. Cambridge

Feather, H. (2000), Intersubjectivity and Contemporary Social Theory: the everyday as critique, Ashgate, Aldershot (on Schutz)

Habermas, J. (1986), 'Hannah Arendt’s Communication  Concept of Power' in Lukes (ed.) op.cit.