Habermas: uncoupling system and life-world
In classical modernity the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) of interpersonal interaction and individual freedom is seen as separate from formal institutional structures and hence social integration (to use Parsons’ classification model) is accomplished separately from system integration.
We need however, to be able to understand how these two levels relate as we did with Bourdieu’s agents and structural reproduction or Giddens’ structuration via duality of structures.
Unlike Parsons, Habermas allows a realm of freedom in that the lifeworld frees individuals from system imperatives (in Habermas’ case reproduction of capitalism and the state, the ‘steering media’ money and power). Therefore Habermas’ view is clearly less deterministic –but can it maintain the plausibility of such an area of freedom in the context of system imperatives? Habermas sees system and lifeworld as having been decoupled in the move away from traditional societies where power rested on the use of mystification and fear as attributes of a religious worldview. Hence rationality is able to accompany the consensus which pre-existed it in the traditional world. Habermas traces the consensuality of communicative practices back to rites performed in the animal world which are then carried over into the human species: rituals demand consensus about the jointly performed symbolic practices. However, in a modern society there is a high degree of cultural diversity and so shared symbols will have a different meaning for each social group, so although we can understand each other through shared symbols we are unlikely to wholly agree about their meaning i.e. reach a consensus. As Merleau-Ponty notes (Sense and Non-sense) we can have a communicative understanding without a consensus (I can see your point of view but that doesn’t mean I have to agree with it).
Refeudalisation (colonisation) of the life-world
In the period of late modernity this separation of spheres (system and life-world) begins to break down as liberal capitalist societies become more manipulative in the interests of maintaining power as non-religious belief systems are more transparent (the workers cannot be fooled about exploitation by rewards in the afterlife etc., see also the war in/against Iraq for a transparency or legitimation problem for the government). The system reaction to delegitimisation is the mediatisation of the lifeworld, its invasion by the influences of money and power from the system world. This involves the symbolic colonisation of the way we interact with others: as a result of commofication etc. we become more manipulative in our personal relationships, urged on by celebrity, fashion etc. to conform to certain norms and hence this influences our thinking about friendship, group membership. As Habermas says, these influences are invisible, ‘inconspicuous’ as we no longer distinguish between honesty, sincerity, ethical behaviour, understanding and beliefs which mask these and corrupt them. The system now speaks through us, a form of ventriloquism, we are possessed or haunted by it, so to speak.
Agency and structure. However, following Parsons’ view of the system worldwe can’t see how our actions might have a reciprocal effect on the system/formal structures and its imperatives. There is no slot in the Theory of Communicative Action for collective action unless we bring in what Habermas has previously said about the public sphere as the point where system and agency overlap via pressure groups, campaigns and social movements, utilising the press and TV and the parties. It is difficult to see how we can otherwise get a purchase on the system worlds and change it (see Swingewood on this).
Schutz and the Lifeworld as Open Horizon of Rationalised Life
Schutz, whom Habermas quotes as influence, argues that the world of bureaucratic systems, can be appropriated by the lifeworld and it’s here that language plays its key role for Habermas. We can reformulate the rationalised contents of the system world as the lifeworld is not closed, bureaucratic thinking but a way of customising information and using it for our own purposes. This is the creative role of the lifeworld which of course has produced the system world in the first place (before it achieves autonomy and acts back in a repressive way). Elswhere it is argued that bureaucracies contain elements of informal activity- see Anselm Strauss, Ideologies of Psychiatric Institutions or Feather, Intersubjectivity and Contemporary Social Theory so that the separation of system and lifeworld is really artificial and a product of the influence of Parsons on Habermas rather than the actuality. Hence as Lefebvre says, whilst capitalism depends on the life or everyday world, it also invades the lifeworld, where the latter serves to mask its activities. Whilst Habermas goes along with this analysis it is difficult to see how his theory of linguistic consensus will allow us to throw off the influences of the state and capital. (See Swingewood on this).
29.11.08
In classical modernity the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) of interpersonal interaction and individual freedom is seen as separate from formal institutional structures and hence social integration (to use Parsons’ classification model) is accomplished separately from system integration.
We need however, to be able to understand how these two levels relate as we did with Bourdieu’s agents and structural reproduction or Giddens’ structuration via duality of structures.
Unlike Parsons, Habermas allows a realm of freedom in that the lifeworld frees individuals from system imperatives (in Habermas’ case reproduction of capitalism and the state, the ‘steering media’ money and power). Therefore Habermas’ view is clearly less deterministic –but can it maintain the plausibility of such an area of freedom in the context of system imperatives? Habermas sees system and lifeworld as having been decoupled in the move away from traditional societies where power rested on the use of mystification and fear as attributes of a religious worldview. Hence rationality is able to accompany the consensus which pre-existed it in the traditional world. Habermas traces the consensuality of communicative practices back to rites performed in the animal world which are then carried over into the human species: rituals demand consensus about the jointly performed symbolic practices. However, in a modern society there is a high degree of cultural diversity and so shared symbols will have a different meaning for each social group, so although we can understand each other through shared symbols we are unlikely to wholly agree about their meaning i.e. reach a consensus. As Merleau-Ponty notes (Sense and Non-sense) we can have a communicative understanding without a consensus (I can see your point of view but that doesn’t mean I have to agree with it).
Refeudalisation (colonisation) of the life-world
In the period of late modernity this separation of spheres (system and life-world) begins to break down as liberal capitalist societies become more manipulative in the interests of maintaining power as non-religious belief systems are more transparent (the workers cannot be fooled about exploitation by rewards in the afterlife etc., see also the war in/against Iraq for a transparency or legitimation problem for the government). The system reaction to delegitimisation is the mediatisation of the lifeworld, its invasion by the influences of money and power from the system world. This involves the symbolic colonisation of the way we interact with others: as a result of commofication etc. we become more manipulative in our personal relationships, urged on by celebrity, fashion etc. to conform to certain norms and hence this influences our thinking about friendship, group membership. As Habermas says, these influences are invisible, ‘inconspicuous’ as we no longer distinguish between honesty, sincerity, ethical behaviour, understanding and beliefs which mask these and corrupt them. The system now speaks through us, a form of ventriloquism, we are possessed or haunted by it, so to speak.
Agency and structure. However, following Parsons’ view of the system worldwe can’t see how our actions might have a reciprocal effect on the system/formal structures and its imperatives. There is no slot in the Theory of Communicative Action for collective action unless we bring in what Habermas has previously said about the public sphere as the point where system and agency overlap via pressure groups, campaigns and social movements, utilising the press and TV and the parties. It is difficult to see how we can otherwise get a purchase on the system worlds and change it (see Swingewood on this).
Schutz and the Lifeworld as Open Horizon of Rationalised Life
Schutz, whom Habermas quotes as influence, argues that the world of bureaucratic systems, can be appropriated by the lifeworld and it’s here that language plays its key role for Habermas. We can reformulate the rationalised contents of the system world as the lifeworld is not closed, bureaucratic thinking but a way of customising information and using it for our own purposes. This is the creative role of the lifeworld which of course has produced the system world in the first place (before it achieves autonomy and acts back in a repressive way). Elswhere it is argued that bureaucracies contain elements of informal activity- see Anselm Strauss, Ideologies of Psychiatric Institutions or Feather, Intersubjectivity and Contemporary Social Theory so that the separation of system and lifeworld is really artificial and a product of the influence of Parsons on Habermas rather than the actuality. Hence as Lefebvre says, whilst capitalism depends on the life or everyday world, it also invades the lifeworld, where the latter serves to mask its activities. Whilst Habermas goes along with this analysis it is difficult to see how his theory of linguistic consensus will allow us to throw off the influences of the state and capital. (See Swingewood on this).
29.11.08
posted by Howard Feather at 4:09 AM
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